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Cleaning Up the Muck
A TAKINGS ANALYSIS OF THE MORATORIUM ON
DEEPWATER DRILLING FOLLOWING THE BP OIL
SPILL
INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon drilling
platform exploded in the Gulf of Mexico. The blast killed eleven
workers and triggered the worst oil spill in America’s history.1
The platform was owned by Transocean Services, Ltd., and was
under lease to British Petroleum, PLC (BP), for the purpose of
drilling an exploratory well five thousand feet below the ocean’s
surface off the coast of Louisiana.2 Aside from the unfortunate
deaths of the workers, another tragedy unfolded as it became
clear that the spill could not be stopped for weeks or even
months. Around-the-clock video feeds of the oil spewing from the
leak showed viewers the enormity of the disaster, capturing the
hearts and interest of the nation.3 It was estimated that over two
hundred million gallons escaped from the leaking well before it
was finally capped in mid-July.4 The environmental effects on
the region’s wildlife⎯and on the people who depended on that
wildlife for their subsistence⎯were staggering.5

1

See Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630
(E.D. La. 2010).
2
Andrea Chambers & Jerry Brown, The 2010 Gulf Oil Spill and Questions
of Liability, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, Aug. 25, 2010, available at 2010
Emerging Issues 5281.
3
In fact, the oil spill was the most searched-for term in Yahoo’s search
engine in 2010, the first time since 2005 that a celebrity had not topped the list.
Michael Liedtke, BP Oil Spill Swamps Yahoo Search Engine in 2010, YAHOO!FINANCE,
(Dec. 1, 2010, 7:54 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/BP-oil-spill-swamps-Yahoo-apf1847949440.html?x=0&.v=6.
4
Editorial, Gulf Leak Is Over, Impacts Still Uncertain, DAY (New London,
Conn.), Sept. 22, 2010. To put this astronomical number in perspective, the infamous
Exxon Valdez disaster that occurred off the coast of Alaska in 1989 resulted in a spill of
about eleven million gallons. David Dipino, Researcher Warns that Current Could Still
Bring Oil to the Area, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Sept. 8, 2010, at 1.
5
Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 630 n.2 (“As a result [of the spill], nearly onethird of the Gulf of Mexico has been closed to commercial and recreational fishing.”).
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Following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, it became
immediately apparent that a prolonged oil leak posed a
significant threat to wildlife living in and near the Gulf of
Mexico. The region “is home to more than 400 marine and
coastal fish and wildlife species,” including five endangered
species of sea turtle, a variety of birds such as brown pelicans
and terns, and several marine mammals including sperm
whales and bottlenose dolphins.6 Additionally, it is the largest
spawning ground in the world for blue fin tuna.7 About a month
after the spill began, more than seven hundred dead animals
had already been collected from the Plaquemines, Jefferson,
and Lafourche parishes of Louisiana alone.8 Unlike beach goers
and bathers in the area, many animals were ill-equipped or
unable to avoid exposure to the spill.9 One expert expressed
concern over the potential threat to the reproductive
capabilities of fish in the area, noting, “Fish can swim away
from the oil spill . . . , but eggs and larvae cannot.”10 Even
worse, sea turtles in the area were observed attempting to feed
on the tar balls that were prevalent in the Gulf.11
Aside from those animals affected by direct exposure to
the oil, the damage the spill caused to the marine and coastal
habitat also posed more long-term, indirect threats. The salt
marshes and mangrove coastlines that make up the wetlands
surrounding the Gulf were described as practically impossible to
clean without doing additional damage.12 Coast Guard Admiral
6

Gulf Coast Oil Spill—pt. 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Schweiger, President/CEO,
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n).
7
Dipino, supra note 4.
8
Kia Hall Hayes, Coalition Asks BP to Allocate $750million: Money for
Economic Losses, Seafood Safety, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, May 30, 2010.
9
See Gulf Coast Oil Spill—pt. 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Schweiger, President/CEO, Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n). For example, young sea turtles were described as “prone to being
poisoned or coated by the sticky oil.” Id. Their adult counterparts fared no better as they
“show[ed] no natural avoidance behaviors when confronted with an oil slick” and those
that remained in the affected area often suffered from malnutrition. Id. Likewise, birds
that tried to cope with their exposure to the spill by grooming the oil out of their feathers
often exacerbated their problems by inadvertently consuming more oil in the process. Id.
10
Dipino, supra note 4.
11
Gulf Coast Oil Spill—pt. 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Schweiger, President/CEO,
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n).
12
Matthew Brown, Cleaning Oil-Soaked Wetlands May Be Impossible, Scientists
Say, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 22, 2010), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/
2010/05/cleaning_oil-soaked_wetlands_m.html; see also Bruce Barcott, Forlorn in the
Bayou, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 2010), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2010/10/gulfoil-spill/barcott-text.
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Thad Allen, in charge of the federal effort to clean up the spill,
described oil in the wetland marshes as a “worst-case scenario.”13
These wetlands are essential to the water quality of estuaries,
with 98 percent of the fish and shellfish of the Gulf relying on
them for food, shelter, and breeding.14 The potential danger was
even more ominous considering that “[m]ore than 20 years after
the Exxon Valdez spill, oil can still be found on Alaska’s beaches,
and many species have not completely recovered.”15
In addition to the perils facing the wildlife and the
environment, the spill was particularly alarming for those
people involved in Louisiana’s seafood, tourism, and recreation
industries, which bring in almost $4 billion each year.16 Even
with the spill barely a month old, and before pictures of the
coastal impact inundated the American household, USA Today
found that 13 percent of people polled would not eat any seafood
that originated in the Gulf.17 Adding to these fears was a concern
that the aggressive cleanup efforts might actually increase the
damage to seafood and the environment in general.18 The
chemical dispersants being used were of particular concern.19
The dispersants used by BP to break up and dissolve the oil
were assumed to be safe, but, alarmingly, the long-term health
and environmental effects are still not well known.20
Additionally, while the use of dispersants may be an effective
means for hastening the degradation of oil, it also “increases the
13

Brown, supra note 12.
See Barcott, supra note 12.
15
Gulf Coast Oil Spill—pt. 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Schweiger, President/CEO, Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n). The larger population size and greater importance of the Gulf of Mexico to the
national economy was another reason the impact and liability of the BP spill was predicted to
be much greater than that of the Exxon Valdez. Jonathan Stempel, Special Report: BP Oil
Spill a Gusher for Lawyers, REUTERS (June 30, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/
30/us-oil-spill-bp-liability-idUSTRE65T2MZ20100630. One expert noted that “[t]his is not
an attenuated 38,000 people on the coast of Alaska 4,000 miles away. Harms are likely
to be larger, with a population more than 100 times greater in the impact zone and
much larger economies and coastal ecosystems.” Id.
16
Hayes, supra note 8.
17
Id.
18
Kate Kelland, Analysis: Doing Nothing Might Have Been Best for Oil Spill,
REUTERS (June 28, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/28/us-oil-spillscientists-analysis-idUSTRE65R5RC20100628.
19
“BP used an estimated 2 million gallons of the chemical dispersant Corexit
to break up oil, both on the surface and deep underwater near the gushing well.” Sandi
Doughton, Seattle’s NOAA Operation Testing Safety of Gulf Seafood, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2010. According to the Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility,
“One of the greatest unaddressed concerns associated with the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill is [chemical] dispersant contamination of the seafood consumed by the public.” Id.
20
Id.
14
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risk that aquatic life in the water and on the sea floor will be
exposed to oil . . . and add yet more inherently toxic chemicals to
the already toxic oil.”21 The federal government acknowledged
this potential danger, at one point ordering BP to “identify and
use a less toxic and more effective dispersant.”22 Even without
proof of actual contamination or danger, the enormous amount
of media coverage discussing possible contamination resulted in
a general consumer aversion to seafood from the Gulf that, in
turn, destroyed the economic prospects of many of those who
relied on the seafood industry in the region.23
In response to the spill, the White House issued a
moratorium on all oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico and the
Pacific Ocean.24 Critics argued that this action did nothing more
than exacerbate the impact on the region by creating another
class of employees to stand in the unemployment line, namely
those who rely on the energy industry.25 As a result⎯much like
the blobs of oil that arrived on beaches hundreds of miles from
their source⎯the legal consequences quickly spread throughout
the country, touching the lives of thousands of people.26 In
addition to the seemingly endless procession of environmental
liability lawsuits facing BP, companies and individuals in the
industry⎯who were innocent in causing the spill but who felt
they
were
being
punished
or
forced
to
suffer
nonetheless⎯brought litigation against the federal government.27
One of these cases was Hornbeck Offshore Services L.L.C. v.
Salazar, in which a group of offshore oil and gas drilling support
21

Gulf Coast Oil Spill—pt. 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Schweiger, President/CEO,
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n).
22
Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, BP Must Use Less Toxic Dispersant
(May 20, 2010).
23
Gulf Coast Oil Spill—pt. 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Schweiger, President/CEO,
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n). For instance, “[i]n Hopedale, Louisiana, people who typically
make their living from the bounty of the sea are now standing in unemployment lines,
waiting for relief.” Id.
24
Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630 (E.D.
La. 2010).
25
See Siobhan Hughes & Stephen Power, New Ban Hits Oil Drillers, WALL
ST. J. (July 12, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870428820457536
2862315524690.html.
26
A former chairman of the Alaska Oil Spill Commission’s legal task force
after the Exxon Valdez disaster estimated that BP’s clean up and legal liability costs
could reach as high as $90 billion. Stempel, supra note 15. The quantity of lawsuits
involved in the BP litigation is expected to become so large that it has even been
compared to asbestos and tobacco litigation. Id.
27
See First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at ¶ 89(b), Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 10-1663).
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and service providers located in the Gulf sued the government,
claiming that the overly broad moratorium unjustly deprived
them of their service contracts with oil exploration companies
unassociated with the spill.28 Further, they claimed that the
damage was potentially irreparable if those exploration
companies permanently left the Gulf for other waters as a
result of the moratorium.29
Certainly, quick government action was required to stop
and then clean up the leaking oil and to punish those who
caused the spill. But the broad and dramatic oil-drilling
moratorium, and its subsequent detrimental impact on the oil
industry in the Gulf, illustrates the dangerous potential of
reactive government regulation that forces innocent parties to
bear a burden more rightly placed on others. Protection against
this threat can be found in the takings clause of the United
States Constitution. Accordingly, this note will focus on a
takings claim that was briefly mentioned but never fully
argued or ruled on in Hornbeck30 to show that such a claim
should provide a valid recourse for future oil industry plaintiffs
affected by federal regulations in response to oil spills.
Moratoria impose uniquely detrimental burdens on service
industry entities that rely on property interests with a definite
life span. Incorporating these burdens into a traditional
takings analysis will deter the federal government from
passing moratoria that are too rash or broad. At a minimum,
such an application would provide a compensation mechanism
to those who suffer as a result of moratoria that are necessary
but nonetheless detrimental. Accordingly, a court applying a
takings analysis to a factual situation similar to the events
that unfolded in Hornbeck should find that a taking occurred
and that compensation must be paid⎯despite an unwillingness
to come to such a holding in the past.
Part I of this note discusses the government’s response
to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Part II analyzes the legal
28

Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 632.
Id. at 638.
See Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 33, Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No.
10-1663(F)(2)); First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 91; Diamond Offshore’s Brief in Support of
Emergency Motion to Intervene at ¶ 11, Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 101663(F)(2)). Instead of focusing on the takings claim, the bulk of the plaintiffs’
argument and the focus of the court rested on grounds that the moratorium was invalid
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it was arbitrary and capricious.
See Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 636-38.
29
30
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proceedings stemming from the Hornbeck plaintiffs’ lawsuit
against the federal government. Part III describes the history of
the takings claim in order to frame the proper regulatory
takings analysis for the oil-drilling moratorium. Part IV
presents previous examples of federal government action that
affected the property rights of legitimate leaseholders to explore
and drill for oil on their property, and describes the litigation
that arose from it. Part V applies current takings jurisprudence
to determine whether the moratorium in Hornbeck amounted to
a Fifth Amendment taking of property that required just
compensation. Finally, this note concludes by arguing that
Hornbeck
further
demonstrates
that,
while
takings
jurisprudence remains seriously muddled, case law on the
subject provides at least theoretical latitude for plaintiffs to
bring takings challenges against federal moratoria. Further, the
conclusion asserts that the courts have been too conservative in
their analysis of temporary takings and that the oil-drilling
moratorium presents a factual scenario where fairness and
justice require a more liberal and inclusive takings analysis.
I.

THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE

The government took decisive action in response to the
unprecedented environmental disaster caused by the Deepwater
Horizon explosion. President Obama formed a bipartisan
commission dubbed the National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling
(Commission).31 The Commission consisted of a seven-member
team led by former Florida governor and former U.S. senator
Bob Graham and former Environmental Protection Agency
administrator William Reilly.32 It was tasked with “investigating
the facts and circumstances concerning the cause of the
blowout.”33 Investigations are still ongoing at the time of this
writing, but it has been estimated that BP’s civil and criminal
liabilities for long-term restoration of the Gulf will likely exceed
$15 billion34 and could balloon as high as $90 billion.35
31

Juliet Eilperin & Madonna Lebling, Digging Deep After the Oil Spill,
WASH. POST, July 12, 2010, at A6.
32
Eilperin & Lebling, supra note 31.
33
Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
34
John M. Broder, Panel Wants BP Fines to Pay for Gulf Restoration, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010, at A17. In addition to the investigation by the Commission,
several other investigations commenced. Eilperin & Lebling, supra note 31. These
included investigations by the Marine Board of Investigation to identify the factors
leading to the explosion, the House Energy and Commerce Committee to determine the
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In addition to the various investigations into the causes
of and liabilities for the spill,36 President Obama ordered the
Secretary of the Interior, Kenneth Salazar, to report and
recommend any additional precautions and regulations that
should be required to improve the safety of oil exploration and
production on the outer continental shelf.37 The examination
was conducted by the Department of the Interior in conjunction
with a panel of experts from various levels of “state and federal
governments, academic institutions, and industry and advocacy
organizations.”38 After a thirty-day examination, the White
House issued a report39 (Report) purportedly based on the
panel’s findings and ordered a six-month moratorium halting
all offshore exploratory drilling in depths of more than five
hundred feet of water.40
The moratorium met with sharply divided reviews from
politicians and the media alike. Supporters argued the
moratorium was necessary because the government simply
could not risk the possibility of another spill.41 Among these
supporters
was
Representative
Edward
Markey
of
Massachusetts, who noted, “The only thing worse than one oil
extent and impact of the oil spill and BP’s response to it, the House Natural Resources
Committee to determine problems in the Mineral Management Service’s (MMS)
oversight over offshore drilling, and the National Academy of Engineering, which was
charged with independently assessing the cause of the accident. Id.
35
Stempel, supra note 15. For its own part, BP has estimated that $40 billion
should cover its liabilities for the spill. Tom Bergen, Special Report: How BP’s Oil Spill
Costs Could Double, REUTERS (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/
01/us-special-report-how-bps-oil-spill-cost-idUSTRE6B02PA20101201. However, this
number has been disputed as overly optimistic and as an attempt to underestimate the
costs. Id. Instead, an analysis by Reuters stated that the “fines, damages, costs related
directly to the leak, compensation and the damage to BP’s business suggests the final
spill bill could, over the long term, end up [being] twice as much.” Id.
36
Eilperin & Lebling, supra note 31.
37
Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
38
Id. at 630-31.
39
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INCREASED SAFETY MEASURES FOR ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/
deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=33598.
40
Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 631-32. The Report specifically directed the
suspension of “all pending, current, or approved offshore drilling operations of new
deepwater wells in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific regions.” Id. A Notice to Lessees
(NTL) subsequently followed the Report, indicating that the MMS would not consider any
drilling permits for deepwater wells for six months and defining deepwater as depths
greater than five hundred feet. Id. See generally DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS
MGMT. SERV., NTL No. 2010-N04, NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL
AND GAS LEASES IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF REGIONS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO
AND THE PACIFIC TO IMPLEMENT THE DIRECTIVE TO IMPOSE A MORATORIUM ON ALL
DRILLING OF DEEPWATER WELLS (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/
pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=33716.
41
Hughes & Power, supra note 25.
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rig in the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico would be two oil rigs in
the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico.”42 Likewise, Senator Bill
Nelson praised the moratorium stating, “Until we know what
happened with the Deepwater Horizon, and we’ll know very
soon, it makes sense not to put Gulf Coast residents and the
economies there at further risk.”43 The economic consequences
of the moratorium on the Gulf Coast region, particularly on the
oil industry, were acknowledged by supporters but seen as a
necessary evil to prevent additional future harm.44
Critics of the moratorium saw the situation
dramatically differently, finding the undeniably immense
economic consequences impossible to ignore in a region still
recovering from Hurricane Katrina.45 One estimate predicted
the moratorium would cause a nationwide loss of over twelve
thousand jobs, $2.8 billion in economic activity, and $219
million in tax revenue.46 Further, critics worried that drilling
companies currently located in the Gulf, or in the process of
applying for a future lease to drill, would instead leave for
foreign countries rather than wait for the moratorium to end.47
Once gone, the concern was that drilling companies would “not
return for several years, if ever.”48 The long-term effects on the
national economy and scientific progress were lamented as
being equally dire.49
42

Ann Woolner, Editorial, Overreaching Times Two: A Judge Goes Too Far to
Overturn a Deepwater Drilling Moratorium that Went Too Far, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, June 25, 2010 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43
Hughes & Power, supra note 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44
Id.
45
Bill Sasser, Obama Loses in Court Again over Deepwater Drilling Moratorium,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 9, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0709/Obamaloses-in-court-again-over-deepwater-drilling-moratorium. Other critics noted, “The Obama
Administration’s immediate policy response to the oil spill, a categorical ban on all
deepwater offshore drilling, had as much to do with managing public relations as with
managing drilling policy based on sound science.” Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Transparency, Accountability, and Competency: An Essay on the Obama Administration,
Google Government, and the Difficulties of Securing Effective Governance, 65 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 449, 456 (2011).
46
Rebecca Mowbray, Moratorium to Resound Across U.S., Expert Says, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, July 20, 2010.
47
Hughes & Power, supra note 25. The CEO of Diamond Offshore, one of the
plaintiffs in Hornbeck, told a presidential commission that his company had already sent
two deepwater rigs to foreign waters as a result of the moratorium, and warned that “there
won’t be much of a U.S. industry left” if the moratorium remains in place. Id.
48
Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 6, Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D.
La. 2010) (No. 10-1663) .
49
Rebecca Terrell, Oil Leak Outrage, 26 NEW AMERICAN, July 19, 2010,
available at 2010 WLNR 15967962. One senator even compared the moratorium to “the
aftermath of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant disaster . . . that brought all
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LEGAL FALLOUT

The moratorium also sparked significant legal debate.
On the extreme end of the spectrum, the moratorium was
condemned as everything from a blatant executive overreach
lacking reason and spurred by fear,50 to an unconstitutional
regulation of commerce by the executive branch in violation of
the separation of powers.51 Armchair debaters aside, there are
real and tangible legal issues stemming from the actions of the
federal government in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon
accident. On June 7, 2010, Hornbeck Offshore Services, L.L.C.
(Hornbeck) filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana against the Secretary, the
Department of the Interior, the Minerals Management Service
(MMS), and the Director of the MMS seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief to end the moratorium.52 Subsequently,
additional plaintiffs joined the litigation.53 Judge Martin
Feldman, presiding over the case, issued a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of the moratorium.54 The
court held that, based on the administrative record, the blanket
moratorium on all drilling wells of more than five hundred feet
of water was likely to be found “arbitrary and capricious” and
was thus invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act (OCSLA) and
its implementing regulations.55 The following section will
further explore that decision.
A.

The Hornbeck Decision

Judge Feldman framed the issue to be decided in
Hornbeck as “whether the federal government’s imposition of a
general moratorium on deepwater drilling for oil in the Gulf of
Mexico was imposed contrary to law.”56 The statutes governing the

nuclear power plant applications to a screeching halt.” Id. The senator added, “In
hindsight that was not the right decision. Today, we are 30 years behind the French in
nuclear technology.” Id.
50
Woolner, supra note 42.
51
The Constitutionality of Obama’s Offshore Drilling Moratorium,
YOUDECIDEPOLITICS.COM (June 22, 2010, 10:17 PM), http://www.youdecidepolitics.com/
2010/06/22/the-constitutionality-of-obamas-offshore-drilling-moratorium/.
52
Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 632.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 630.
55
Id. at 639.
56
Id. at 630.
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outcome were OCSLA, which provides authority to the Secretary
to suspend leases in the Gulf under certain circumstances,57 and
the APA, which authorizes the federal courts to review final
agency action.58 The plaintiffs generally alleged that the
moratorium by the Secretary as well as the Notice to Lessees
(NTL) implementing the moratorium were “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion and otherwise not in accordance with the
APA, OCSLA and its implementing regulations.”59 Additionally,
they made a brief allegation that the moratorium was an
impermissible “‘taking’ of . . . property rights in violation of the
5th Amendment to the United States Constitution.”60
The focus of the plaintiffs’ complaint was directed at the
arbitrary and capricious claim.61 They claimed that the
moratorium was unwarranted based on the Report provided to
the Secretary by a panel of experts.62 They alleged that the
Secretary had exaggerated or entirely invented the experts’
support and recommendations for the moratorium.63 Further,
they alleged the Secretary had failed to adequately explain the
reasons behind the suspension of operations64 or why he had
chosen a general depth limit of five hundred feet for the drilling
ban.65 The plaintiffs pointed to a lack of individualized
justification for the moratorium, stating,
The Report itself does not contain any facts, data, analysis or risk
assessment concerning why the Secretary imposed a Moratorium on
further drilling by the “33 [existing] wells.” Twenty-nine of these
57

Id. at 632-33 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1)).
Id. at 634 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704).
59
First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 22. One of the expert panelists stated that if anybody had made
the suggestion of a moratorium on existing drilling, “we’d have said that’s craziness.”
Crude Politics, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2010 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60
Diamond Offshore’s Brief in Support of Emergency Motion to Intervene at
4, Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 10-1663(F)(2)).
61
See generally First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27.
62
Id. ¶ 52.
63
Id. ¶ 83. At least some of this skepticism was confirmed when it “was exposed
that an important White House official had changed the Safety Report before its public
release, which created the misleading appearance of scientific peer review.” Hornbeck
Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, No. 10-1663(F)(2), 2011 WL 454802, at *2 (E.D. La.
Feb. 2, 2011).
64
Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 631.
65
The Deepwater Horizon operation was conducted at a depth of over five
thousand feet. Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, supra note 48, at 10. The Report issued to the Secretary noted
that, compared to drilling in shallow water, risks were greater after one thousand feet.
First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
supra note 27, ¶ 89(d).
58
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wells had been subjected to additional inspections following the
Incident. According to the “MMS Deepwater Drilling Rig Inspection
Report” . . . , issued on May 11, 2010, MMS found no violations of
governing regulations or existing permit terms on 27 of the 29
drilling rigs inspected and only minor violations on the two others.
Further, each of the 33 rigs had previously satisfied the rigors of the
MMS permitting process.66

Additionally, they expressed concern about the injurious
economic effects of the moratorium, exclaiming that “lost wages
for direct and indirect jobs lost could be over $165 million to
$330 million per month for every month the 33 platforms are
idle.”67 The long-term effects were viewed as similarly alarming.
The Report stated that the offshore operations provide
employment for approximately 150,000 people.68 The
moratorium put many of these jobs at risk. Further, without
robust and continuous drilling activities, this labor force would
lack incentive to remain in the region, thus reducing the ability
of companies like the Hornbeck plaintiffs to find workers.69
Finally, the plaintiffs also pointed to the possibility that the
moratorium might actually last substantially longer than six
months,70 an unacceptable possibility for an industry that relied
on contracts and equipment with a limited useful life.71
The government countered by citing the relevant portions
of OCSLA that specifically authorize the Secretary to direct a
suspension of drilling whenever it determines that “‘activities
pose a threat of serious, irreparable, or immediate harm or
damage’ to human or animal ‘life, property, [ ] mineral deposit,
or the marine, coastal, or human environment.’”72 The Secretary
highlighted that the moratorium was needed to “address critical
66

First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 46.
67
Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 48, at 23. But see Woolner, supra note 42 (noting that “five days
before filing suit, Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. assured the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the investing public that the ban would have little effect on it”).
68
First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 89a.
69
Id.
70
Id. ¶ 54.
71
Id. ¶¶ 93-98. Plaintiffs noted that they could lose as much as $500,000 per
day for each rig while the moratorium remained in place. See Plaintiffs’ Original
Complaint and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief at
¶ 10, supra note 30. Additionally, some contractual parties were cancelling their
contracts with plaintiffs altogether. First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 67.
72
Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
6, Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010)
(No. 10-1663(F)(2)) (quoting 30 C.F.R. § 250.172(b)).
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spill containment and response deficiencies” and warned that
there were “insufficient available response resources should
another deepwater spill occur while the containment and clean
up efforts [were ongoing] . . . .”73 The government pointed out
that courts must defer to agency decisions that are supported by
a thorough administrative record, and in this case, “the interim
safety measures in the Safety Report and the corresponding
suspension of deepwater drilling [were] appropriately supported
by the Administrative Record.”74 The defendants spent little time
addressing the Fifth Amendment takings claim, asserting only
that it was “both wholly without merit and outside of the
jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate.”75
Judge Feldman issued his decision on June 22, 2010,
holding that the moratorium was contrary to law and that he
was “unable to divine or fathom a relationship between the
findings and the immense scope of the moratorium.”76 He noted
that the Report⎯supposedly the supporting basis for the
moratorium⎯focused narrowly on the Deepwater Horizon
incident alone.77 In contrast, the resulting moratorium was
exceedingly broad, applying to rigs that had exemplary safety
records and that drilled in significantly shallower water than
the Deepwater Horizon.78 Judge Feldman found it hard to
believe that such a suspension would be deemed appropriate in
other contexts, asking, “If some drilling equipment parts are
flawed, is it rational to say all are? Are all airplanes a danger
because one was? All oil tankers like Exxon Valdez? All trains?
All mines? That sort of thinking seems heavy-handed, and

73

Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 5,
Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 10-1663(F)(2)).
74
Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
supra note 72, at 16. The government argued that an agency’s investigation and choice
of methodology are entitled to particularly broad deference when the agency is
responding to an emergency. See id.
75
Defendants’ Response to Diamond Offshore’s Motion to Intervene at 3 n.4,
Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 10-1663(F)(2)).
76
Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
77
See id. “[The Report] is incident-specific and driven: Deepwater Horizon
and BP only. None others.” Id.
78
See id. at 637-38 & n.11; see also Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 48, at 10. The Deepwater
Horizon well was drilled in nearly five thousand feet of water, and the Report addressed
wells in depths greater than one thousand feet, yet the NTL set the moratorium at the
significantly shallower depth of five hundred feet. Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 48, at 10.
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rather overbearing.”79 Accordingly, the court held that the
government’s actions in implementing the moratorium had
been “arbitrary and capricious” and were thus contrary to the
requirements of the APA and OSCLA.80 Therefore, the court
granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction
preventing the moratorium from being enforced.81 Because the
parties had failed to fully argue it, and perhaps to avoid
entering the difficult and muddled jurisprudence of takings
analysis, the court did not analyze or even mention the merits
of the plaintiffs’ takings claim.82
B.

The Government’s Response to the Injunction

The decision by Judge Feldman led to additional
controversy surrounding the moratorium. Only days after the
ruling, the Secretary publicly announced that the government
was working on passing a second moratorium.83 The government
reiterated this intention when⎯just hours before the district
court’s decision was appealed before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit⎯a senior administration official
announced that the government “would immediately issue a new
moratorium” regardless of the outcome of the appeal.84 The
maneuver sparked outrage from critics who claimed that the
statements were made in a brazen attempt to intimidate the
court.85 Nevertheless, on July 12, 2010, the Secretary issued a
79

Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 637. Also of import was the fact that since
1969 there had only been three deepwater blowouts before the Deepwater Horizon,
none of which were in the Gulf of Mexico. See id. at 638 n.11.
80
Id. at 639. The court was careful to note that “a suspension of activities
directed after a rational interpretation of the evidence could outweigh the impact on
the plaintiffs and the public” but that here the facts of the case could not support such
a determination. Id.
81
See id.
82
See generally Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627.
83
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Complaint at 2, Hornbeck, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 10-1663(F)(2)). After the first
injunction was ordered, the Secretary stated, “‘The decision to impose a moratorium on
deepwater drilling was and is the right decision’ and that ‘I will issue a new order in
the coming days that eliminates any doubt that a moratorium is needed, appropriate,
and within our authorities.’” Id. at 5.
84
Id. at 6.
85
See Kingsley Guy, Op-Ed., Obama’s Over-Reach: President Remaking
Courts, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), July 25, 2010, at F5 (comparing the
Obama administration’s response to Judge Feldman’s injunction to the court packing of
FDR and expressing that “[r]egardless of their views on offshore drilling, Americans
should be concerned about the heavy-handed action by the Obama administration of
reinstating a moratorium. It demonstrates contempt for the judicial system and the
attitude of, ‘I’m the president and I can do anything I want.’”).
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memorandum rescinding the first moratorium but ordering a
new⎯yet similar⎯blanket suspension on offshore oil drilling.86
Additionally, the government moved to dismiss the original suit
on the grounds of mootness since the original moratorium was
no longer in effect.87 Counsel for the plaintiffs, incensed by the
government’s actions, invoked Marbury v. Madison and
exclaimed that the decision to pass a new moratorium with the
same practical effects as the now enjoined original one
constituted executive interference with the judicial branch and
the judicial review process.88
The motion for dismissal was addressed on September
1, 2010, when Judge Feldman again ruled against the
government, holding that mootness did not apply and stating
that the second moratorium was essentially the same as the
first one.89 In addressing the issue of whether the Secretary had
the authority to rescind the first moratorium, he noted that the
proper procedure for an agency seeking to reconsider a decision
that is under judicial review is for the agency to move the court
to remand.90 The court voiced its concern that “if agencies are
not required to move to remand, they may use rescission and
reissuance of their decisions as a way to manipulate the federal
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.”91 Ultimately, Judge Feldman
concluded the rescission did have “some administrative force,”92
but this was not enough to save the defendants’ motion to
dismiss. The court criticized their maneuvering, expressing
that, “In reality, the new moratorium covers precisely the same
rigs and precisely the same deepwater drilling in the Gulf of
Mexico as did the first moratorium.”93 The court did not
specifically decide whether the second moratorium was again
86

See Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, No. 10-1663(F)(2), 2010
WL 3523040, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 1, 2010).
87
See id.
88
See Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Complaint, supra note 83, at 16. “Simply put, the law does not allow for the
manipulation of the ‘orderly operation of the federal judicial system,’ . . . .” Id. (quoting
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994)). According to
the plaintiffs, it did not matter how necessary or right the defendants believed their
actions to be; instead, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must
of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint, supra note 83, at 16 (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
89
See Hornbeck, 2010 WL 3523040, at *1, *7-8.
90
See id. at *4-5.
91
Id. at *4.
92
Id.
93
Id. at *1.
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arbitrary and capricious (the sole issue before the court was
whether the case surrounding the first moratorium was now
moot), but instead focused on whether the harm imposed by the
first moratorium would also be imposed by the second.94 Under
the voluntary cessation exception to mootness claims, a federal
court will only find a case to be moot if the subsequent
government action makes it clear that the initial harm could not
reasonably be expected to recur.95 Judge Feldman noted that the
government’s public announcements immediately following his
initial ruling sharply undermined their argument that the second
moratorium was based on a significantly supplemented
administrative record.96 More importantly, these public
announcements and posturing indicated that there was a
reasonable expectation the harm to the plaintiffs could recur and
thus the government’s repeal of the first moratorium did not
render the action moot.97 Accordingly, Judge Feldman denied the
defendants’ motion to dismiss.98
For some time, while the Hornbeck suit was underway,
new litigation continued to emerge as a result of the
moratorium. Additional plaintiffs brought claims that the
moratorium had effectively ended drilling in shallow water
located in entirely different parts of the country.99 But it now
94

See id. at *7. Defendants argued that the new moratorium was based on
new information and a new administrative record and that by lifting the old
moratorium all plaintiffs’ claims had become moot. See id. at *1.
95
See id. at *5. Plaintiffs argued that their claims were not moot because the
new moratorium applied to the same rigs, in the same area, for the same amount of
time, and thus the new moratorium would cause them the same harm as the old one.
See id. at *2.
96
Id. at *7. Commenting on the Secretary’s announcement promising a
second moratorium just moments after the first injunction was entered, the court
stated, “It is difficult to square such public expressions of resoluteness, with the
government’s assertion that its rescission of the first moratorium and its issuance of a
new moratorium is entitled to solicitude and should not be considered litigation
posturing.” Id. at *8.
97
Id. at *7.
98
Id. at *8.
99
Margaret Fisk, Alaska Claims in Suit U.S. Government Improperly
Banned Off-Coast Drilling, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/print/2010-09-09/u-s-improperly-banned-drilling-off-alaska-coast-state-alleges-inlawsuit.html. For instance, the state of Alaska brought suit against the Secretary,
Alaska v. Salazar, 3:10-cv-00205 (D. Alaska 2010), in early September 2010 claiming
that the Secretary improperly banned drilling off the coast of Alaska following the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. No drilling permits have been issued in the Arctic since
the incident, even though an Interior Department spokeswoman acknowledged that
“[t]he moratorium is on deep-water drilling and there is no deep-water drilling in
Alaska.” Id. Additionally, suits were also brought closer to the site of the spill. For
example, Exxon Mobile Corporation sued the federal government in August 2011
claiming that it was being deprived of its right to drill in the Julia field in the Gulf of
Mexico, an area estimated to contain billions of barrels of oil. Jonathan Stempel, Exxon
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appears that any formal need for the courts to enjoin the
moratorium has largely passed; the moratorium was lifted on
October 12, 2010, several weeks before it was scheduled to
terminate.100 Following the lifting of the moratorium, the
Hornbeck plaintiffs continued to evaluate their legal options,
but it was generally believed that “this [was] a dispute that
[had] run its course.”101 There was lingering concern, however,
that a de facto moratorium remained in place.102 Todd Hornbeck
(CEO of Hornbeck) stated,
[T]he industry hasn’t seen the final requirements for what we would
have to do to be able to actually get a permit issued. . . . Until that is
done, lifting the moratorium may be just a moot or perfunctory
act. . . . I’m skeptical that it will be anytime soon that permits will be
issued . . . .103

Critical politicians also exuded skepticism as to the
practical effects of lifting the moratorium.104 These concerns
proved to be legitimate. In a later decision on February 2, 2011,
stemming from the Hornbeck litigation, Judge Feldman stated,
“Still . . . no drilling permits have been issued for activities
barred by [the moratorium] as of this date.”105 Indeed, more
than a year after the spill, the offshore oil exploration and

Sues U.S. to Reverse Offshore Ruling; Canceled Leases Estimated to Hold Billions of
Barrels, NAT’L POST (Can.), Aug. 19, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16476759.
100
See Matthew Daly, Administration Lifts Freeze on Drilling, Official Says
New Rules Improved Safety, Cut Risks of Another Disaster, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL,
Oct. 13, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 20480874.
101
Rebecca Mowbray, Moratorium Suits Become Moot, Hornbeck Takes Some
Credit for Action, NEW ORLEANS TIME PICAYUNE, Oct. 13, 2010, available at 2010
WLNR 20432013. Litigation stemming from the moratorium continued, however. For
instance, in Hornbeck the plaintiffs would later file a claim seeking attorney’s fees and
costs expended in an attempt to prevent the government from circumventing the first
moratorium by passing a second nearly identical one. The plaintiffs prevailed on this
claim and Judge Feldman, holding that the government had contemptuously ignored
the injunction halting the first moratorium, eventually awarded the Hornbeck
plaintiffs $528,801.18 in attorney’s fees and $444.33 in costs. Hornbeck Offshore
Services, L.L.C. v. Salazar, 2011 WL 454802, at *1-3 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011); Hornbeck
Offshore Services L.L.C. v. Salazar, 2011 WL 2516907, at *3 (E.D. La. June 23, 2011).
102
Daly, supra note 100.
103
Id. Likewise, the executive director of the Shallow Water Energy Security
Coalition warned his colleagues about the practical effect of the ending of the
moratorium, telling them that “as soon as they try to pop the champagne bureaucrats
will be there to stick the cork back in the bottle.” Gerard Shields, Deep-Water Drilling
Ban Lifted, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Oct. 13, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 204881285.
104
Daly, supra note 100. For example, Louisiana Senator Mary Landrieu
placed a hold on a Senate vote to confirm President Obama’s nomination of Jacob Lew
for head of the Office of Management and Budget until drilling activity actually
resumed. Id.
105
Hornbeck, 2011 WL 454802, at *2.
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production industry was only “slowly opening up once more” in
the Gulf of Mexico.106
The new regulations instituted “after the spill
strengthened safety measures and reduced the risk of another
catastrophic blowout.”107 But as the Secretary stated, “there will
always be risks involved with deep water drilling.”108 Because
future oil spills remain a likely possibility, it is necessary to
clearly define the rights and responsibilities of the government
in responding to these spills with blanket, albeit temporary,
moratoria or similar regulations. Although the arbitrary and
capricious arguments presented in Hornbeck proved to be an
effective protection against an improper restriction of property
rights, such claims provide better protection against a flawed
decision-making process than they do against an unjust
decision or result. Future problems may instead arise in
circumstances where the government’s decision to implement a
moratorium is supported by an adequate Administrative
Record, limiting the protection provided by the APA. These
situations pose a threat to innocent parties whose property
rights are unfairly burdened by that moratorium.
Alternatively, there may be situations where the circumstances
require a proper moratorium but where notions of justice and
fairness nonetheless require some form of compensation to
those negatively affected. Accordingly, takings claims should
serve to fill this gap in protection, even though historically they
have met with little success.
III.

THE HORNBECK TAKINGS CLAIM IN THE CONTEXT OF
TAKINGS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

Although the focus in Hornbeck began with a claim that
the moratorium was arbitrary and capricious,109 the plaintiffs
106

John Shimkus, ExxonMobil Battles U.S. over Gulf Oil Discovery,
ENERGYDIGITAL.COM (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.energydigital.com/oil_gas/exxonmobilbattles-us-over-gulf-oil-discovery.
107
Daly, supra note 100.
108
Id. In addition to the Secretary’s acknowledgement of the inherent risk
associated with deepwater drilling, a presidential panel reported to President Obama
that absent significant reform in both the industry and the government’s policies, a
similar oil spill “might well recur.” Wendy Koch, Panel Warns Gulf Oil Spill Could
Happen Again, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2011), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
greenhouse/post/2011/01/panel-gulf-oil-spill-happen-again/1.
109
As previously discussed, see supra Part II.A, the court focused on the
arbitrary and capricious allegations despite a takings claim briefly made by the
plaintiffs. The court, in fact, did not mention any takings claim. The reason for this
omission is unclear.
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also briefly asserted that the moratorium constituted an
unconstitutional taking of private property.110 Additionally,
after joining the case in July 2010, Diamond Offshore alleged
the following:
By virtue of their actions, Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ rights
under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. That
amendment provides that no person shall suffer a “taking” of private
property without due process of law or just compensation. As set
forth above, the actions of Defendants herein constitute a taking of
Plaintiffs’ contract rights without due process of the law for which
Plaintiffs seek non-monetary relief.111

The relevant provision of OSCLA requires the Secretary
to manage the offshore leasing program, stating, “Leasing
activities shall be conducted to assure receipt of fair market
value for the lands leased and the rights conveyed by the
Federal Government.”112 Certainly, the moratorium prevented
leaseholders in the Gulf, even those operating safe rigs, from
enjoying the fair market value of their property while the
moratorium was in place. Undoubtedly, it can be said that
much of this value in terms of access to the oil and gas was
restored as soon as the moratorium was lifted, but this fails to
account for the fact that entities in the oil industry rely on
contracts and equipment that often have a limited lifespan.
The industry as a whole was likewise threatened if oil rig
operators and their crews chose to take their business to other,
more business-friendly waters.113
The defendants’ only response to the takings allegation
was relegated to a footnote claiming that it should be
“dismissed . . . because the second claim for relief, which
purports to assert a Fifth Amendment Takings claim, is both
110

The Hornbeck takings claim may present procedural questions of ripeness
and proper jurisdiction. These issues are outside the scope of this note, which will
assume that future plaintiffs would properly address the concerns associated with
them. See generally Robert Meltz, Inverse Condemnation and Related Government
Liability, SC 43 ALI-ABA 57 (1998) (discussing common problems and obstacles arising
in takings claims against the federal government).
111
Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and Injunctive Relief, supra note 30, ¶ 33. Before Diamond Offshore joined
Hornbeck, Hornbeck more generally alleged that the moratorium infringed on its
property rights as protected by the Fifth Amendment but did not specify a takings
claim. First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 91.
112
43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(4) (2006).
113
Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 48, at 6; Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, supra note 30, ¶ 34.
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wholly without merit and outside the jurisdiction of this Court
to adjudicate.”114 Yet, it appears that the issue may not be as cut
and dry as the defendants asserted. Takings law is extremely
unsettled and has been described as “both lacking in theory
and unpredictable in application.”115 The United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged as much, with Justice John
Paul Stevens commenting that “[e]ven the wisest lawyers
would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope
of this Court’s takings jurisprudence.”116 This means that future
court decisions are required to settle the area of takings law
and that future plaintiffs have some latitude to persuade these
courts to expand the protections afforded by the takings clause.
Because future cases may not involve factual circumstances
amenable to alternative legal remedies such as the arbitrary
and capricious claims presented in Hornbeck, the takings
clause could serve as an alternative means for protecting
against overly broad and unfairly burdensome regulations.
The Supreme Court has established two main categories
of unconstitutional takings: per se takings and regulatory
takings.117 The two types require very different analytical
approaches to determine whether a taking has occurred.118
According to Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency,119 Hornbeck must be analyzed under
the ad hoc balancing test established for regulatory takings in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.120
Traditionally, courts have been hesitant to find a taking under
this framework in circumstances similar to Hornbeck.121 But,
the ad hoc test courts have been applying is not ad hoc enough.
These courts have failed to differentiate between the value
taken in the case of land development moratoria (that
114

Defendants’ Response to Diamond Offshore’s Motion to Intervene at 3 n.4,
Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010) (No.
10-1663(F)(2)).
115
John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1003, 1006 (2003).
116
Id. at 1007 (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 866
(1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
117
Emily S. Newton, Executive Use of Private Claims to Strike a Public
Bargain, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 487, 496 (2006) (comparing Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), with Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
118
Id.
119
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
120
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
121
See, e.g., Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1370-71
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
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temporarily affect the value of real property or a potential
home, for example) compared to the value taken by moratoria
on a service industry that relies on property rights with limited
lifespans. In the former case, property values may continue to
rise while the moratorium is in place, or, even if that proves
not to be the case, full value should be restored upon rescission
of the moratorium.122 In the latter circumstance, however,
moratoria do not simply result in a temporary diminution in
the resale value of the property. Instead, any rebound in value
after rescission fails to mitigate the significant lost time and
investment, potentially resulting in irreparable harm including
the destruction of the industry entirely.123
Despite the unsettled nature of takings jurisprudence
and courts’ reluctance to engage in takings analysis, the more
recent additions to the Supreme Court’s takings framework
provide the opportunity for enforceable takings claims in these
Hornbeck-like circumstances. In the interest of “fairness and
justice,”124 the long-term threat posed by a moratorium and the
nature of the property right at issue should be taken into
greater consideration by courts as they apply the Penn Central
balancing test. Thus, the circumstances that led to Hornbeck
provide a tangible example of a claim that—based on the
theoretical justifications for temporary takings law presented
in Tahoe-Sierra—could be held a taking.
A.

Regulatory Takings and the Penn Central Balancing
Test

The text of the Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution reads as follows: “nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”125 This
seemingly straightforward text, however, has proven
exceedingly difficult in practice and application.126 Part of the
problem stems from a lack of evidence indicating the Framers’
meaning behind the takings clause or the reasons for including
it.127 Thus, courts have needed to flesh out the meaning and
122

See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332, 341.
See Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, supra note 30, ¶ 33.
124
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342.
125
U.S. CONST. amend V.
126
Fee, supra note 115, at 1007.
127
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 134 (2005). “Precedents for the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause were
relatively few in number and narrow in application . . . [and] the compensation
123
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scope of the clause.128 One of the first cases to distinguish
between physical and regulatory appropriation of property was
Mugler v. Kansas,129 but it was the rise of the modern
government and the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon130
that really began to define the scope of the clause.131
Pennsylvania Coal involved a mining company that had sold
the surface rights of a plot of land but had expressly and
contractually reserved the rights to remove any coal found
under it.132 Subsequent to the sale, Pennsylvania passed a
statute forbidding the mining of coal that would result in the
subsidence of any structure used for human habitation,
essentially voiding the contractual reservation.133 The Supreme
Court determined that the statute made it commercially
impracticable to mine the coal and had “very nearly the same
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or
destroying it.”134 Accordingly, the Court held that the statute
was invalid because it amounted to a taking without just
compensation.135 In a later case, the Supreme Court would
describe Pennsylvania Coal as being the “leading case for the
proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers
important public policies may so frustrate distinct investmentbacked expectations as to amount to a taking.”136 Thus, after
Pennsylvania Coal it was clear that the Court would deem
some legislative acts as going “too far” and rising to the level of
a taking of private property.137 The obvious question that
remained before the Court, and a question that still remains
unsettled today, is how far is too far?138 More than fifty years
later, in Penn Central, the Supreme Court would finally
attempt to set forth a framework for answering that question.139

requirement was not generally recognized at the time of the framing of the Fifth
Amendment.” Id. Additionally, James Madison initially proposed the Fifth
Amendment, but “[t]here are apparently no records of discussion about the meanings of
the clause in either Congress or, after its proposal, in the states.” Id.
128
Id. at 136. Because of the lack of precedent in the area, most of the early
Supreme Court decisions accorded with early state decisions. Id.
129
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
130
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
131
Fee, supra note 115, at 1009.
132
Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
133
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
134
Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
135
Id. at 414-15.
136
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137
Pa. Coal, 260 U.S at 415.
138
See Fee, supra note 115, at 1010.
139
See generally Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.
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The question presented in Penn Central was whether a
city could, as part of a program to preserve historic landmarks,
place restrictions on the development of these landmarks
without the restriction amounting to a constitutional taking
requiring payment of just compensation.140 The case again
addressed the issue of regulatory takings, and the Court
implicitly rejected the “proposition that a ‘taking’ can never
occur unless government has transferred physical control over
a portion of a parcel.”141 In a landmark decision, the Court
established what would become known as the Penn Central
balancing test, later described as a “multi-factor test for
determining whether a regulation restricting the use of
property effects a taking.”142 The test consisted of a case-by-case
analysis of three factors143: (1) the economic impact of the
regulation on the plaintiff; (2) the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct144 investment-backed
expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental
action.145 The Court may have laid out the framework for
regulatory takings, but the application of that framework to
this day remains disjointed. In fact, critics have condemned it
as being both “convoluted and seemingly arbitrary.”146
B.

Lucas and Its Progeny: Per Se Takings

Although the evolution of takings jurisprudence now
makes per se takings inapplicable to the case at hand, it is
useful to briefly discuss this second category because previous
cases147 have used such analysis under similar factual
140

Id. at 107.
Id. at 122 n.25.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2603 n.6 (2010).
143
The Court never actually announced a specific set of factors to be used in
the balancing test, but these three were “especially prominent” and were again cited by
the Court a year later, solidifying their importance in regulatory takings analysis.
Joshua P. Borden, Derailing Penn Central: A Post-Lingle, Cost-Basis Approach to
Regulatory Takings, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 870, 875-76 (2010).
144
Later cases have changed the word “distinct” to “reasonable.” Christopher
Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222,
1251 (2009). The Court made this change without acknowledging any distinction
between the terms, but the change has had tangible effects on subsequent courts’
analysis of takings claims. See id. “[T]his factor is now principally used to distinguish a
property owner’s reasonable expectations from pie-in-the-sky development dreams.” Id.
145
See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
146
Borden, supra note 143, at 870-71 (exclaiming that “one cannot help but
believe that a better, sounder, approach must exist”).
147
See, e.g., Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 120, 123
(1999) (finding that a per se taking had occurred where government delay in deciding
141
142

2012]

CLEANING UP THE MUCK

1307

circumstances. Shortly after instituting the Penn Central
balancing test, the Supreme Court began to carve out
exceptions that required a different analytical framework.
These exceptions reflected circumstances where the claimant
was automatically entitled to just compensation, without an
“inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the
restraint.”148 The per se takings exception to the Penn Central
balancing test applies to the following: (1) takings that amount
to a physical occupation of the property by the government and
(2) regulations that result in the total loss of value of the
property.149 The case that defined the first exception was Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., where the Court held
that permanent physical occupation of property—even in the
case of two measly four-inch by four-inch metal cable boxes—is
always a taking, “without regard to whether the action achieves
an important public benefit or has only minimal economic
impact on the owner.”150 The Court justified its holding by noting
that a permanent physical occupation destroys many strands
from the “bundle of property rights” that have historically been
protected by property law, including the right to possess, use,
dispose, and exclude.151 It also noted that a balancing test was
largely unnecessary because such cases present “relatively few
problems of proof” compared with regulatory takings.152
The second category of per se exceptions to the Penn
Central balancing test—those regulations that deny all
economically beneficial or productive use of the land—was
defined in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.153 The
Court noted that these types of regulations “carry with them a
heightened risk that private property is being pressed into
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating
serious public harm.”154 Further, like permanent physical
occupations, the Court explained,

application to develop oil leases for a substantial period of time amounted to an
absolute loss of value in the property during that time).
148
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
149
Id.
150
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419-20 (1982).
151
Id. at 435 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); United States
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
152
Id. at 437.
153
See generally Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003. The plaintiff in Lucas, an owner of two
undeveloped parcels of land, argued that by passing a law barring the erection of any
permanent habitable structures on certain beachfront property, the state legislature
had taken his property and that he was thus entitled to compensation. Id. at 1009.
154
Id. at 1018.
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We believe similar treatment must be accorded confiscatory
regulations, i.e., regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial
use of land: Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or
decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.155

Thus, “[w]hen . . . a regulation that declares ‘off-limits’
all economically productive or beneficial uses of land goes
beyond what the relevant background principles [of property
and nuisance law] would dictate, compensation must be paid to
sustain it.”156
C.

Temporary Takings and Moratoria: The Importance of
Tahoe-Sierra

The fact that a moratorium lasts for only a limited
period of time157 is not fatal to a regulatory takings claim.158
Instead, the duration of the restriction is only one factor for
courts to consider.159 The Supreme Court has held that the
“effect of a regulation must be measured against the ‘parcel as
a whole,’” however the Court has failed to fully define this
term.160 Earlier cases usually focused on the amount of physical
or spatial portions of a land parcel impaired by a restriction to
determine if a taking had occurred.161 The Supreme Court in
155

Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1030. The Court attempted to lay out a clear framework for per se
takings analysis, stating:
156

The “total taking” inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail . . . analysis
of among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or
adjacent private property, posed by the claimant’s proposed activities, the
social value of the claimant’s activities and their suitability to the locality in
question, and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided
through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent
private landowners) alike.
Id. at 1030-31 (citations omitted).
157
In Hornbeck, the moratorium lasted less than six months, although at the
time the claim was originally filed, there was concern that it might last much longer.
First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
supra note 27, ¶ 54.
158
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 334-35 (2002).
159
Id. at 342.
160
Fee, supra note115, at 1029-30.
161
See Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Law Symposium: Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other “Exceptions” to Liability for Fifth Amendment
Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the “Rule,” 29 ENVTL. L. 939, 948-53 (1999)
(discussing how various cases have dealt with the fact that regulations “are three
dimensional [and] have depth, width, and length” (quoting First English Evangelical
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Tahoe-Sierra, however, focused on a different slice of the
property—the temporal dimension affected by the regulation.162
Specifically, the Court addressed the issue of how to analyze a
temporary land development moratorium and how to
determine if such a regulation could ever amount to a taking.163
Unfortunately, because the Court answered the question by
responding “neither ‘yes, always’ nor ‘no, never’,”164 the analysis
is not exactly straightforward. The Court’s description of and
focus on “fairness and justice” as central tenants of takings
analysis, though, should provide at least some future takings
victims the opportunity to bring a successful claim.165
The Court in Tahoe-Sierra built upon the principle
established in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, where the Court previously addressed
temporary takings in general.166 The Court in First English
held, “[W]here the regulation has already worked a taking of
all use of property, no subsequent action by the government
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period
during which the taking was effective.”167 In that case, though,
the Court was concerned with determining compensation once
a taking had concededly occurred, and thus did not specifically
address the threshold question of whether the temporary
denial of land use had constituted a taking in the first place.168
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court took that first step and established
the framework to be used for analyzing temporary moratoria in
the takings context.169 The Court rejected the petitioners’ claim
that a temporary taking that resulted in the total deprivation
of all economic use while the moratorium was in place was

Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987)). At least in terms of physical
restrictions, landowners are not permitted to conceptually sever individually affected
segments from the property as a whole in order to argue that the use or value of these
segments has been totally destroyed by the regulation. Fee, supra note 126, at 1030. Yet,
courts have sometimes struggled in determining what the relevant parcel to be analyzed is
in order to determine both whether a taking has occurred, and if so, how much
compensation is required. See Meltz, supra note 110, at 72; Fee, supra note 126, at 1029-32.
162
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 321.
165
See id. at 334; Steven J. Eagle, Planning Moratoria and Regulatory
Takings: The Supreme Court’s Fairness Mandate Benefits Landowners, 31 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 429, 505 (2004).
166
See generally First English, 482 U.S. 304.
167
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 n.17 (1992)
(internal brackets omitted) (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 321).
168
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 328.
169
See id. at 334-38.

1310

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:3

subject to the per se takings analysis established in Lucas.170
The Court worried that such a categorical rule would open the
floodgates to takings litigation and would apply to even
“normal delays in obtaining building permits . . . as well as to
orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes.”171
Rather, the Court stated that Justice Brennan’s “parcel as a
whole” theory of takings analysis established in Penn Central
must be applied to the temporal dimensions of a property the
same way it applies to the physical dimensions.172 Accordingly,
the Court held that the “better approach to claims that a
regulation has effected a temporary taking requires careful
examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances” by
using the Penn Central balancing test.173 But, important to a
Hornbeck-type scenario, the Court made it clear that “[i]n
rejecting petitioners’ per se rule, we do not hold that the
temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that
it effects a taking.”174 Instead, “the duration of the restriction is
one of the important factors that a court must consider in the
appraisal of a regulatory takings claim . . . .”175 Further,
throughout the opinion, the Court repeatedly referenced notions
of fairness and justice as instructive to the holding.176
The question of how long a restriction is too long is one
that remains unclear and confusing. For instance, courts have
held, “A permanent physical occupation does not necessarily
mean a taking unlimited in duration. [Instead, a] ‘permanent’
taking can have a limited term.”177 Interestingly, many
temporary regulations held to not constitute takings at all are
longer in duration than the “permanent” deprivation that
required application of the per se rule in Lucas.178 One thing is
170
171
172

Id. at 334.
Id. at 335 (citations omitted).
Eagle, supra note 165, at 445. Justice Brennan stated in Penn Central:

“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated. . . . [T]his Court focuses rather both on the character of
the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole . . . .
Id.
173

Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 337.
175
Id. at 342.
176
See id. at 321, 332-36; see also Eagle, supra note 165, at 505.
177
Eagle, supra note 165, at 456 (quoting Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United
States, 6 F.3d 1573, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
178
See id. The delay in development in Lucas lasted only two years. Id.
174

2012]

CLEANING UP THE MUCK

1311

clear, however: courts have tended to put great weight on the
durational factor of temporary takings.179
The impact of Tahoe-Sierra on takings jurisprudence
cannot be overemphasized. For example, its effect can clearly
be discerned from the two opposing decisions reached by the
United States Court of Federal Claims in Bass Enterprises
Production Co. v. United States.180 The litigation commenced in
Bass Enterprises after the Bureau of Land Management denied
the plaintiff lessees’ application to explore and drill for oil and
gas on their leased property for forty-five months while the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined the
environmental impact that such development posed.181 The
Court of Federal Claims initially found a temporary (but per
se) taking, stating, “Plaintiffs have not been permitted to use
their leases for a substantial period of time. Their loss during
that period was absolute.”182 The court cited Lucas, explaining
that the limited duration of the regulation did not bar
constitutional relief, and ordered damages in the amount of the
interest that the plaintiffs would have earned on the oil and
gas profits during the delay period.183 Following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Tahoe-Sierra, however, the government’s
motion for reconsideration was granted.184 This time the Court
of Federal Claims applied a Penn Central balancing test and
found that “the economic impact on Bass was de minimis and
that the Government’s delay was reasonable given the
importance of protecting the public . . . .”185 After “[w]eighing
the factors and the circumstances surrounding the delay as a
whole,” the court concluded that there had not been a taking.186
Bass Enterprises is an example of the heavy emphasis
courts have placed on the duration of the delay when applying
a temporary takings analysis following Tahoe-Sierra.187
Accordingly, under a similar judicial application, Hornbeck, or
179

See Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (noting that an extraordinary delay in governmental decision making may
constitute a taking, but citing delays of eight years, seven years, and forty months that
were not held to be takings).
180
Compare id., with Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 120 (1999).
181
Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 381 F.3d at 1362-64.
182
Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 45 Fed. Cl. at 123.
183
Id. at 123-24.
184
Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 381 F.3d at 1364.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 1365. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims,
holding that the delay was not extraordinary in duration and that the Penn Central
factors were properly applied. Id. at 1370-71.
187
See id. at 1366-69.

1312

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:3

plaintiffs similarly situated, may have difficulty bringing a
successful takings claim despite the significant value that was
lost—and which could not be recovered—during and following the
moratorium. Still, this result may not be fair or justified based on
takings law as it currently stands, and it therefore warrants a
closer look. Additionally, while there are many factual similarities
between Bass Enterprises and the circumstances leading to
Hornbeck, there are enough distinctions to warrant further
analysis.188 To begin this analysis, it is useful to look at how courts
have previously treated takings claims in cases following
moratoria on oil drilling. This examination will illustrate how the
evolution of takings jurisprudence requires a different outcome
here than was reached in both Bass Enterprises and these
previous moratoria cases.
IV.

PREVIOUS CASES INVOLVING MORATORIA BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING OIL SPILLS

Moratoria have been used by administrative agencies as
a common means to “preserve the status quo while formulating
a more permanent . . . strategy.”189 Moratoria have been
employed in a wide variety of contexts, from use of the death
penalty,190 to the prohibition of killing marine mammals,191 to
the suspension of mining of valuable fossil fuels.192 Likewise,
moratoria and regulations suspending operations involving
gas, oil, and mineral rights have been the subjects of takings
analysis in the past.193 In fact, the Deepwater Horizon incident
is not the first time that the Department of the Interior has
188

See infra Part V.B.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 337 (2002).
190
See Victor L. Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty for Juveniles, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 72 (1998) (discussing the American Bar Association’s 1997
resolution instituting a moratorium on death penalty jurisdictions “to correct several
flaws and to afford greater fairness in the process”).
191
See Carol B. Koppelman, Anderson v. Evans: The Ninth Circuit
Harmonizes Treaty Rights and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 HASTINGS W.N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 353, 368 (2010) (describing the 1972 moratorium against
killing marine mammals).
192
See Sam Kalen, The Devolution of NEPA: How the APA Transformed the
Nation’s Environmental Policy, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 483, 524 (2009)
(discussing the Department of the Interior’s informal moratorium on new coal mining
leases and permits until “the Department could develop a coherent approach to the
leasing and development of the nation’s coal resources”).
193
See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
475-76 (1987); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 395 (1922); Pauley Petroleum Inc.
v. United States, 591 F.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
189
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broadly suspended drilling rights via moratorium following an
oil blowout.194 Nor is it the first time that⎯in response⎯a
takings claim was brought by an aggrieved plaintiff.195
The massive oil spill in Santa Barbara, California, in
January 1969 spurred several cases that explored the property
rights of leaseholders in the Santa Barbara Channel.196 The spill
“caused severe property and environmental damage” and
prompted the Secretary of the Interior to order all companies in
the Santa Barbara Channel to cease all drilling and production
regardless of their involvement in the spill.197 This line of cases
focused on the authority of the Secretary to pass regulations that
amounted to a taking and determined that the duration of the
regulation was a requisite factor in determining that authority.198
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, the Secretary of the Interior
followed up the initial moratorium with a second one in 1971
that was to last until 1973.199 He justified the second suspension
by stating that it was necessary to give Congress time to
consider whether it wished to pass legislation to terminate the
leases in the interest of conservation.200 The plaintiffs in the
case⎯who had paid $153 million for the leases⎯filed suit,
seeking, among other things, declaratory judgment that the
suspension was outside the scope of the Secretary’s authority
and must be revoked.201 In addressing the first suspension the
court declared that “[a]fter the leases in question were made,
events occurred in the Santa Barbara Channel that were both
unexpected and very dangerous to the environment . . . [causing]
the Secretary to reconsider the dangers to the natural resources
of the area if drilling were to proceed under the leases.”202 As
was the case in Hornbeck, the case focused on whether the
suspension was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the
194

See, e.g., Pauley Petroleum, 591 F.2d at 1312.
See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 1975).
196
See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1973); Union
Oil, 512 F.2d at 743; Pauley Petroleum, 591 F.2d 1308.
197
Pauley Petroleum, 591 F.2d at 1312.
198
See generally Gulf Oil, 493 F.2d 141; Union Oil, 512 F.2d 743; Pauley
Petroleum, 591 F.2d 1308.
199
Gulf Oil, 493 F.2d at 143.
200
Id. The decision was supported by the director of the United States
Geological Survey, who noted that continued operation under the leases posed the
following risks: “[T]he possibility of another blowout; the possibility that wells would be
improperly plugged . . . should [they later be abandoned]; [and] the possibility that
geologic structures such as the one which contributed to the 1969 spill would be
encountered and fractured, thus causing large quantities of oil and gas to escape.” Id.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 146.
195
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APA; the court, however, also touched on several aspects
associated with a takings analysis, including just
compensation.203 In addressing a possible takings claim, the
court noted that in a letter accompanying the proposed bill to
terminate the leases, the Secretary wrote that the legislation
would “offer[] a mechanism for determining and paying just
compensation to the lessees . . . .”204 The court held that
“Congress authorized the Secretary to suspend operations
under existing leases whenever he determines that the risk to
the marine environment outweighs the immediate national
interest in exploring and drilling for oil and gas.”205 The court
also held that, since the lessees had not yet begun drilling, the
circumstances at hand permitted a suspension while Congress
weighed the merits of the proposed bill.206 The court cautioned,
however, that the Secretary could not “continue to issue
comparable orders one after another and justify them by
repeatedly having his proposed legislation introduced in the
Congress . . . at some point, if Congress does not act, there
must be an end to the matter.”207
The same facts that led to Gulf Oil spurred litigation in
Union Oil Co. of California v. Morton.208 The Secretary of the
Interior had initially granted plaintiffs the right to build a new
floating drilling platform.209 But, following the spill, the
Secretary announced that Union Oil would not be permitted to
build the additional platform.210 Unlike Gulf Oil, which
discussed a temporary suspension, the issue in this case was
whether the Secretary had the power to permanently suspend
the plaintiffs’ lease.211 The plaintiffs claimed that the Secretary
had denied them the full exercise of their rights under their
lease with the federal government212 and that the suspension
amounted to a permanent taking without compensation.213 The
203

See id. at 146-47.
Id. at 147.
205
Id. at 144.
206
Id. at 146.
207
Id. at 148. Indeed, on petition for rehearing the court held that the bill had
been before Congress for four sessions without any substantial action to push the bill
forward towards law and that therefore the Secretary’s power to suspend the leases
vanished on October 18, 1972. Id. at 149.
208
512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
209
A provision in plaintiff’s lease specifically allowed for the erection of
floating drilling platforms. Id. at 746.
210
Id.
211
See id. at 751.
212
Id. at 746.
213
Id. at 750.
204
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court acknowledged that, while the Secretary had the authority
to suspend the lease under certain circumstances,214 the
executive branch had no intrinsic power of condemnation and
thus could not suspend the lease indefinitely.215 Further, a
suspension that “depriv[ed] Union of all benefit from the lease
in that particular area” would be a permissible taking if
enacted by Congress (as long as just compensation was
provided), but was outside the scope of the Secretary’s power.216
Accordingly, the court analyzed whether the Secretary had
impermissibly taken Union’s property by determining whether
the suspension was temporary or was instead an indefinite
suspension amounting to a “pro tanto cancellation of [the]
lease.”217 A suspension that was limited in time by the
“occurrence of new events or the discovery of new knowledge
which can be anticipated within a reasonable period of time”
would not constitute a taking, according to the court.218
Ultimately, the court determined that the facts were
insufficient on the record to determine the answer to that
question and remanded the case to the district court.219
The Santa Barbara oil spill also led to Pauley Petroleum
Inc. v. United States.220 In that case, the plaintiffs were a
consortium of oil corporations who acquired leases from the
federal government to explore and drill off the coast of Santa
Barbara.221 In conjunction with the general moratorium, the
Secretary promulgated a regulation relating to the level of
liability for general lessees involved in oil spills.222 The
Secretary also required all drilling companies in the area to
submit “all geological, geophysical and structural information,”
explaining that after this information was studied on a leaseby-lease basis the companies would be permitted to resume
drilling.223 The plaintiffs brought suit claiming, among other
things, that the absolute liability requirement and clearance
program amounted to a regulatory taking because it rendered
their leases “economically worthless and exposed them to
214

Id. at 748.
Id. at 750 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
Id. at 751.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 752.
219
Id.
220
591 F.2d 1308, 1308 (1979).
221
Id. at 1311-12.
222
Id. at 1312.
223
Id. at 1313. The lead plaintiff “delayed its response to this demand and
never fully answered.” Id.
215
216
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unmeasurable risks.”224 They argued that the regulation applied
retroactively and imposed absolute liability for all cleanup
costs as well as for any damage to third-party property caused
by a spill.225 The court held that the power to suspend leases
could not rise to such a level that it resulted in a total
suspension of rights because the Secretary does not have the
authority to take property.226 As was the case in Union Oil, the
court determined that the plaintiffs had “fail[ed] to meet at
least one of the prerequisites for a constitutional taking—the
requirement that the taking be authorized by Congress.”227
Thus, the plaintiffs could not bring a takings claim because the
power to take property was solely vested in Congress, and did
not extend to actions by the Secretary.228 According to the court,
“Congress clearly did not intend to grant leases so tenuous in
nature that the Secretary could terminate them, in whole or in
part at will.”229 Further, the court noted that the “short,
temporary suspension was plainly not so severe a property
deprivation as to constitute a fifth amendment taking.”230
Accordingly, the court held that a takings claim was not the
proper means of recourse for the plaintiffs.231 Again the court
required a regulation to be permanent and authorized by
Congress for it to afford a valid takings claim.232
Many of these cases share similar factual circumstances
to the Hornbeck scenario. Despite this precedent, however, the
outcome of a takings claim in Hornbeck, or future claims
arising under similar circumstances, remains unclear. The
courts in the Santa Barbara spill cases held that takings claims
were precluded because the Secretary lacked authority to
restrict property rights in this manner, often hinging that
authority on the duration or permanence of the suspension.233
This position is outdated, however, in light of subsequent
precedent.234 The Hornbeck takings claim need not hinge on the
224

Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1313.
226
Id. at 1326.
227
Id.
228
Id. (citing Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 1975)).
229
Id. (citing Union Oil, 512 F.2d at 751).
230
Id. at 1327.
231
The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ other causes of action, which
included breach of contract and mutual mistake claims. Id. at 1326 (citing Union Oil,
512 F.2d at 751).
232
Id.
233
See, e.g., Union Oil, 512 F.2d at 751.
234
See David W. Spohr, “What Shall We Do with the Drunken Sailor?”: The
Intersection of the Takings Clause and the Character, Merit, or Impropriety of
225
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permanent versus temporary distinction because the duration of
the regulation is now only a part of the more fully established
regulatory takings framework.235 And any notion that only
actions by Congress, and not those by a member of the executive
branch, can amount to a taking is similarly misplaced in today’s
analysis.236 Instead, “the Takings Clause bars the State from
taking private property without paying for it, no matter which
branch is the instrument of the taking.”237 Accordingly, it is
necessary to analyze the Hornbeck claim under the more modern
approach to temporary regulatory takings. Although the
Supreme Court has attempted to clarify and establish a working
framework for this area, Hornbeck illustrates how the unsettled
state of takings jurisprudence has made some plaintiffs
unwilling to bring these kinds of claims and courts hesitant to
venture into such an analysis if provided an alternative.238 It is
precisely because this area is still malleable, though, that
plaintiffs and courts should look to the takings clause to protect
worthy victims from regulations that go too far.
V.

AN AD-HOC ANALYSIS OF THE TAKINGS CLAIM IN
HORNBECK

A court may be hesitant to find a takings claim in
Hornbeck, despite the expansion of takings jurisprudence since
the Santa Barbara oil spills and facts that distinguish
Hornbeck from Bass Enterprises. Such a result, however, is
both unfortunate and undesirable, and should be modified in
light of the concepts of fairness and justice discussed in TahoeSierra.239 Admittedly, there is still confusion and discord in
takings law, but a proper reading of Tahoe-Sierra illustrates
Regulatory Action, 17 S.E. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 21 (2008) (noting that “[a] legislative grant of
authority to an agency to exercise discretion over various affairs could lead to acts by
[executive] officials that were illegal but still within the [congressionally defined] scope
of agency authority” (citing Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States, 146 F.3d
1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002) (holding that the duration of a regulation is
not dispositive regarding the takings question).
235
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335.
236
“The Takings Clause . . . is not addressed to the action of a specific branch
or branches. It is concerned simply with the act, and not with the government
actor . . . .” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2601 (2010) (discussing a judicial takings claim).
237
Id. at 2602.
238
See Meltz, supra note 110, at 73 (describing confusion as to when cases
should be analyzed as a breach of contract instead of a taking and noting the general
preference of the federal courts to take the breach of contract route if possible).
239
535 U.S. at 333-34.
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the “considerable latitude” available to property owners to
assert claims based on these concepts.240 The facts in Hornbeck
provide an example of the danger for plaintiffs in a service
industry who may be injured uniquely and significantly
because of the permanent effects of a temporary regulation.
Accordingly, these types of claims are worthy of relief under a
more contextually inclusive three-part Penn Central analysis
that looks at (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the
distinct investment-backed expectations of the plaintiff; and (3)
the character of the government regulation.241
A.

The Economic Impact of the Regulation

The economic impact is a fact-specific question, and in
the case of the Hornbeck plaintiffs it is immense in terms of
sheer numbers. The plaintiffs alleged that the moratorium led
to the termination of valuable service contracts with the oil and
exploration companies in the Gulf of Mexico.242 Plaintiffs noted
that lost job wages could be more than $330 million for each
month the moratorium remained in place.243 Likewise, the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) predicted “that
the moratorium would lead to the loss of more than 23,000 jobs
in the . . . region and that oil and gas industry spending in [the
Gulf would] be reduced by more than $10 billion.”244
The leases,245 contracts, and vessels that constitute the
property rights in the industry last for only a limited time, and
thus it is difficult or impossible to recoup any lost expenses as a
result of suspensions of operations.246 These effects can be
distinguished from those imposed by moratoria in other
240

Eagle, supra note 165, at 505.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
242
First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶¶ 58-67. The allegations were not mere conjecture; as
early as June 2010 valuable contracts were being cancelled or reduced. See id.
243
Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 48, at 23.
244
Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 14 n.13, Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, 2010 WL
3973222 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2010) (No. 10-CV-01941). It was also reported that the
moratorium would result in approximately $500 million in lost wages for workers in
the oil industry. Steven Shavell, Should BP Be Liable for Economic Losses Due to the
Moratorium on Oil Drilling Imposed After the Deepwater Horizon Accident?, 64 VAND.
L. REV. 1995, 1999 (2011).
245
Complaint at ¶ 55(b), Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, 2010 WL 2812241
(E.D. La. July 9, 2010) (No. 10-CV-01941).
246
Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 48, at 3.
241
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contexts,247 and make the plaintiffs more worthy of relief
considering the immense level of investment that they have
made into both their own equipment and the industry as a
whole in the region.248 Additionally, unlike in other contexts, the
plaintiffs in Hornbeck do not enjoy any reciprocity of advantage
that might mitigate the damage suffered when they are
subjected to a stop-drilling order.249 Instead, for plaintiffs, and
similarly situated companies, the harm suffered by moratoria
is without any potentially positive consequences.
Also, the final economic impact may be even greater
than initial estimates suggested. The BOEM estimates were
based on a six-month moratorium, but at the time the
complaint was filed the moratorium was predicted to last much
longer.250 Additionally, the Department of the Interior
estimated that long-term job loss might significantly exceed
BOEM’s initial estimates due to the potential relocation of rigs
to other regions and the potential demise of some drilling
companies.251 Those fears did not fully materialize (the
moratorium did in fact end before six months), yet the lifting of
the moratorium did not bring about an immediate end to the
negative economic effects it created.252 Thus, the impact of the
247

See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 48, at 3-6. Regarding investments put into their own equipment,
Diamond Offshore explained, for example, that the cost of one of its floating rigs can
exceed $500,000 per day. Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, supra note 30, ¶ 10. Likewise, the value of the
deepwater vessels built by plaintiff Bollinger Shipyard Company in the last five years
exceeds $200 million. First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 38.
249
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 341 (2002). The Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra noted that all landowners in the
community benefited from the moratorium because the development restriction also
prevented their neighbors from engaging in unwanted development. Id. In fact, in that case,
the moratorium might protect or even increase the property values in the area. Id.
250
First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 54.
251
Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 14 n.13, Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, 2010 WL
3973222 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2010) (No. 2:10-CV-01941-MLCF-JCW); Hornbeck’s
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 48,
at 6 (explaining that “[w]hen a deepwater rig or vessel leaves a drilling region, it does
so under a long-term contract and will not return for several years, if ever”). At least
two deepwater rigs had left for foreign waters as early as July 2010. Hughes & Power,
supra note 25. But see Daly, supra note 100 (noting that loss of jobs in the Gulf region
is likely temporary).
252
People in the industry feared the possibility that a de facto moratorium
would remain in place, which would extend the suspension of operations and increase
the injury. See Matthew Daly, Administration Lifts Freeze on Drilling, Official Says
New Rules Improved Safety, Cut Risks of Another Disaster, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL,
248
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regulation could potentially be felt far into the future. More
importantly, future moratoria could last significantly longer,
thus resulting in an even greater impact and illustrating the
need for takings clause protection.
B.

Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations

The reasonable investment-backed expectations of
plaintiffs affected by the moratorium provide several
distinguishing characteristics from previous precedent that
help support the finding of a taking. Whether a regulation
results in a change to the status quo is an important factor for
the Supreme Court in a takings analysis. For example, the
Penn Central Court “hinted that it may have [ruled differently]
if the . . . regulation had prevented [the property] from being
used as it always had been.”253 Thus, it is more reasonable for
parties to expect their permits and contracts to continue
unhindered once they have obtained all necessary
authorizations and drilling has already commenced. The
plaintiffs here are not seeking to develop property beyond its
current state; rather, they simply seek to continue using their
property as they have for many previous years. Similarly, they
are not seeking an initial permit to begin utilization of their
property by exploring and drilling for oil, as was the case in
Bass Enterprises.254 Accordingly, while the delays in both Bass
Enterprises and Hornbeck stemmed largely from the need to
protect against a “possible environmental and health hazard,”255
only the Bass Enterprises delay resulted in an
extension⎯rather than a disruption⎯of the status quo.
The facts in Bass Enterprises represent a situation
where the plaintiffs had more reason to expect delays than do
the plaintiffs in Hornbeck. In Bass Enterprises, the lease in
question was above a portion of an underground nuclear waste
storage site.256 The delay was imposed while the EPA
Oct. 13, 2010; see also Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, No. 10-1663, 2011
WL 454802, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011). In fact, several months after the moratorium
was lifted, drilling permits were still not being issued. Id. at *2.
253
ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 127, at 197. Further, the Supreme Court
noted that the type of moratoria at issue in Tahoe-Sierra was one that is routinely used
to preserve, not disrupt, the status quo. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337.
254
See Bass Enters. Prod. Co v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
255
Id. at 1367. The court in Bass Enterprises noted that such a situation
justifies delay because “we do not want to ‘encourage hasty decisionmaking’ by the
Government.” Id.
256
Id. at 1362.
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determined if it was necessary to condemn and obtain the
leasehold in its entirety to protect the integrity of the site.257 Thus,
it was unknown whether any safe use of the lease could ever be
engaged in by the leaseholder.258 In contrast, the leases and
contracts in Hornbeck were for rigs that had recently passed
inspections and had been deemed to conform to all safety
regulations by the MMS.259 Also, there had been no similar
blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico since 1969.260 Thus, there was little
reason to anticipate another spill. Instead, it was more reasonable
to expect that as long as the parties continued to comply with all
safety regulations they would not suffer any delays.
Likewise, although “delay is inherent in complex
regulatory . . . schemes,”261 such a delay is more reasonably
expected when operations have not yet commenced. The
decision to allow drilling on a portion of a site designated for
nuclear waste storage required careful deliberation to
determine the effects on the site as a whole. The Bass
Enterprise plaintiffs had knowledge that these regulations
were in place before they began any drilling activities. Thus,
they should have expected that they might not immediately be
granted the use of their lease, and such a delay would do
nothing to alter the status quo. Like the disposal of nuclear
waste, the oil industry is highly regulated;262 still, the oil rigs in
Hornbeck had conformed to these regulations and procedural
requirements and had previously been operating safely and
without issue.263 There was little reason for the plaintiffs to
expect any change to these operations, barring individual
safety violations by the rig operators. Thus, by banning the
operation of all oil rigs, the broad moratorium seriously
disrupted the status quo, unfairly burdened innocent parties,
257

Id. at 1363.
Additionally, the Bass Enterprise plaintiffs had the security of knowing
they would be compensated if the government determined drilling to be permanently
unsafe because the federal government would then condemn the property and pay just
compensation. See id. at 1362-63.
259
First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 46. Twenty-seven of twenty-nine recently inspected
rigs had no violations; the other two had only minor violations. Id.
260
See Hornbeck Offshore Servs. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 638 n.11
(E.D. La. 2010).
261
Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 381 F.3d at 1366 (quoting Wyatt v. United States,
271 F.3d 1090, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
262
Takings are generally less likely to be found in industries that are highly
regulated. Meltz, supra note 110, at 66. This alone does not bar all takings claims
though. Id. at 67.
263
First Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, ¶ 46.
258
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and destroyed the investment-backed expectations of the oil
service industry in the Gulf.
Further, in determining the safety of oil exploration and
drilling, Congress has provided an expectation that the
Department of the Interior will proceed expeditiously.264 The
relatively short time frame of thirty days that Congress has
allowed for the agency to approve exploration plans submitted
under OSCLA265 supports a reasonable expectation of freedom
from extended delay in the industry. Accordingly, it is
reasonable for plaintiffs with property interests in the oil
industry in the Gulf of Mexico to expect government-imposed
delay not to last much longer than thirty days. The length of
the moratorium here far exceeded that expectation.
A similar argument draws support from dicta in TahoeSierra. In acknowledging that considerations of “fairness and
justice” were the touchstone of moratoria aimed at curbing
abusive land development, Justice Stevens indicated that,
under the right circumstances, the Court could “craft a
narrower rule that would cover all temporary land-use
restrictions except those ‘normal delays’” associated with the
industry or application process.266 There is little precedent for
what constitutes a normal delay as it applies to moratoria on
drilling following an oil spill. Oil drilling resumed under
heightened standards following the Santa Barbara spill,
however, after only about two months.267 Therefore, it is
reasonable for the plaintiffs to expect that their investment in
the Gulf would not be disturbed by the government for any
substantially longer duration.268
In contrast, a takings argument is weakened by the fact
that the moratorium officially lasted less than six months, a
very short period of time compared with other delays that have
264

See In re Core Commc’ns., Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
43 U.S.C. § 1340(c) (2006).
266
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 333 (2002) (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A.,
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)); see also Eagle, supra note 165, at 442. The Court determined
that such a rule “would certainly have a less severe impact on prevailing practices,” but
cautioned that “it would still impose serious financial constraints on the planning
process.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337.
267
See Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 1308, 1312, 1314 (Ct.
Cl. 1979). The Secretary immediately requested that drilling operations cease when the
spill occurred on January 28, 1969. Id. at 1312. The Secretary gave approval to
recommence operations on April 1, 1969. Id. at 1314.
268
Although the moratorium officially lasted only about five months, the
added regulations imposed by the government prevented operations from resuming for
longer. Daly, supra note 100; see also supra note 252 and accompanying text.
265
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been held to not be takings.269 Although the economic impact
was drastic and potentially devastating to companies in the oil
drilling and exploration business in the Gulf of Mexico, these
companies should be able to regain most of the value of their
leases in time, now that the moratorium has been lifted. Yet,
for those service companies that rely on other entities that
have left for foreign waters, this reassurance is not nearly as
comforting.270 Moreover, the Tahoe-Sierra Court justified its
refusal to find the temporary restriction in that case to be a
taking by explaining, “[l]ogically, a fee simple estate cannot be
rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use,
because the property will recover value as soon as the
prohibition is lifted.”271 This assertion may be true in the case of
temporary planning/development restrictions on real estate (as
was the restriction at issue in Tahoe-Sierra), but it fails to
account for the significant loss in value imposed in the present
situation. Unlike the Tahoe-Sierra landowner, many companies
in the oil industry rely on property interests that amount to
less than a fee simple estate. Instead, their property interests
are vested in contracts272 and support vessels that have a
limited useful life.273 Accordingly, the higher the percentage of
these useful lives consumed by the moratorium, the more likely
a court should be to find a taking.274
Finally, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra articulated that the
petitioners had failed to offer a persuasive account of why
moratoria should be treated differently from ordinary permit
delays.275 Further, the Court condemned the petitioners’ claim

269

See Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2004). The Supreme Court has indicated that while the length of the moratorium is not
dispositive, the longer the delay, the more likely a taking has occurred. See TahoeSierra, 535 U.S. at 341 (“It may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for more
than one year should be viewed with special skepticism.”).
270
Only two of the thirty-three deepwater oil rigs left the Gulf for other fields,
but this result could have been much worse if the first moratorium had not been
enjoined in Hornbeck. See Cynthia A. Drew, The Gulf Deepwater Drilling Moratorium:
While Merits Still Pending, Already Significant Practical Effect?, ENVTL. L. REP. (2010),
available at LEXIS, 40 ELR 11137. Future plaintiffs who do not have the ability to
enjoin regulations under alternative means may not be as lucky. See supra Part IV.
271
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332.
272
Complaint at ¶ 1, Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, 2010 WL 2812241 (E.D.
La. July 9, 2010) (No. 10-CV-01941).
273
Hornbeck’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 48, at 2.
274
See Eagle, supra note 165, at 473.
275
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337 n.31.
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as being too broad when brought as a facial challenge,276 leaving
open the possibility that petitioners may have succeeded on an
as-applied claim.277 Here, the shortened lifespan of the property
interests at issue provides this kind of persuasive reasoning.
Additionally, as applied to this case, there is another clear
reason why a moratorium is different and indeed more
burdensome than a normal permit delay⎯the long-term
potential to lose existing business contracts and clients
permanently to other regions of the world. This type of threat
is unique to the context of property interests that may move,
terminate, or disappear in response to government action, such
as the mobile deep-water oil rigs that are the source of business
for the Hornbeck plaintiffs.
C.

The Character of the Government Regulation

The final Penn Central factor is the “character of the
governmental action.”278 It is not entirely clear what the Court
had in mind when it described this factor, although it might
have been an “attempt to separate out physical invasions from
all other types of regulation or [an] attempt to distinguish one
subset of permissible regulations from others.”279 Some courts in
the past have given this factor significant weight and have
appeared unwilling to find a taking where the moratorium is
clearly a regulatory action that “arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good.”280 More recently, however, the
Court has been reluctant to place much weight on this third
factor and has explicitly rejected any analysis looking into
whether the regulation serves a public purpose.281 Accordingly,
the third Penn Central factor may now mean little more than
whether the government action is characterized as physical as
276

Id. at 334; see also Eagle, supra note 165, at 464, 470, 501 (noting that the
Court’s hand in ruling was largely forced by procedural issues of the case such as the
way the challenge was phrased and presented).
277
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334.
278
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
279
Eagle, supra note 165, at 449. “The need to more readily characterize the
physical invasion as a taking lasted only for four years [until the holding in
Loretto] . . . .” Id.
280
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Some courts have also looked for evidence of
bad faith on the part of the government in determining whether a taking has occurred.
See Eagle, supra note 165, at 476. Such an inquiry is no longer appropriate, though,
under Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005).
281
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 532 (holding that the “substantially advances” for a
legitimate public use test is inappropriate for takings analysis).
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opposed to regulatory, and will need to be more clearly defined
by future court decisions.
Ultimately, any court deciding the outcome under
factual circumstances similar to the Hornbeck case would need
to weigh all these circumstances282 to determine whether the
magnitude of the government’s interference with the plaintiffs’
property rights was so severe that it required compensation.
Despite many persuasive arguments and facts supporting the
finding of a taking in Hornbeck, it is unclear whether the
plaintiffs could have succeeded in their takings claim. Courts
have exhibited a tendency to put strong emphasis on the length
of temporary moratoria and have displayed a general
reluctance to find temporary takings.283 Nonetheless, Hornbeck
provides an interesting example illustrating the arguments
that are available to future plaintiffs subjected to similar
regulations, at a time in the future when takings jurisprudence
has begun to accept and apply the interests in fairness and
justice articulated in Tahoe-Sierra.284
CONCLUSION
The limited focus on a potential takings claim by the
parties in Hornbeck illustrates that this area of law is still very
much uncertain and in flux. Yet, future plaintiffs need not view
this uncertainty as a problem. Instead, it should be seen as
providing increased flexibility, allowing individual plaintiffs to
shape persuasive arguments based on their specific
circumstances. A more factually inclusive and flexible approach
to the current takings framework would provide better
protection and induce the government to more thoroughly
internalize the consequences of regulations that may go too far.
Critics have complained that “[t]he persistence of
incoherence, instability and incomplete explanations in this
area of the law suggests that the [Supreme] Court itself is
dissatisfied with the tests it has developed, yet is unable to
produce a more satisfying jurisprudence.”285 Accordingly, there
have been numerous proposals for both the expansion and
282

Significantly more facts from both sides would certainly be desirable, but
presumably these would be presented in a case that involved a takings claim advanced
more assertively than in Hornbeck.
283
See generally Meltz, supra note 110.
284
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 321, 334 (2002).
285
Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2003).
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contraction of the scope of protection provided by the takings
clause. On one side of the argument is Richard Epstein, who
has recommended a dramatic expansion of takings protection.286
According to Epstein, the “government must compensate for
every diminution in value it causes to owners by restricting the
use of property beyond inherent common law limitations.”287 On
the “other end of the spectrum, Peter Byrne has argued
that . . . [b]eyond physical intrusions, the regulatory takings
doctrine should be abolished.”288 Because Tahoe-Sierra
expressly left open the prospect of “as applied” challenges to
moratoria, there is room for the case law to move towards
either end of the spectrum.289 A takings analysis based on the
specific circumstances of each case, determined through a more
contextually inclusive application of Penn Central, would
establish an appropriate middle ground. Indeed, such an
application seems to embody the language used in TahoeSierra, where the Court explained, “we are persuaded that the
better approach to claims that a regulation has effected a
temporary taking ‘requires careful examination and weighing
of all the relevant circumstances.’”290
Yet the courts have been overly reluctant to find takings
due to a rigid application of the Penn Central test. There are
inherent differences between the temporary regulation
discussed in Tahoe-Sierra and regulations like the oil drilling
moratorium that warrant an end to this reluctance. Thus,
instead of applying a single rule for all moratoria, courts
should look at how that moratorium is affecting the property
right at issue. Courts must account for the fact that temporary
regulations place a greater burden on property interests in the
oil service industry⎯because of their limited duration⎯as
compared to property interests in other settings. This is
especially true in a case like Hornbeck where the property
interests are movable and may not return if prohibited for too
long.
Including these contextual circumstances in a Penn
Central analysis would more closely adhere to the theories
behind takings protection discussed in Tahoe-Sierra. Such an
application would prevent the government from unfairly
286

Fee, supra note 115, at 1015.
Id.
288
Id. at 1016.
289
See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334.
290
See id. at 335 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
287
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burdening plaintiffs in service industries; it would also, at a
minimum, result in more thoughtfully crafted regulations by
forcing the government to internalize the possibility of
compensation. Further, it would not prevent the government
from instituting moratoria when absolutely necessary, but
would simply require payment to those unfairly or
disproportionately burdened by those regulations. Finally,
adopting a more context-specific application seems appropriate
as a concession to the ill-defined state of modern takings law.
Doing so would allow courts to worry less about futile attempts
to decipher and rigidly apply this jurisprudence and more
about finding a result that is fair and just.
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